from 1948 to 1953 as one whose head reported being a veteran, and from 1954 onwards as one whose head reported being a veteran of World War II (or similarly for the Korean War). I classify a spending unit as purchasing a house in the previous year if it reported buying any real estate in the previous year (1947) , buying a house in the previous year (1948) , or buying its current home in the previous calendar year (1949 to 1957) . Secondary spending units who do not report any information on having bought a home the previous year are classified as not having purchased a home.
Section V.C uses the entire sample from the 1960 survey. Spending units are defined similarly in that year. I calculate the value of a spending unit's liquid assets, home equity, and other assets as a share of its home value and calculate the share of spending units that owned a home in 1960 for which this proportion was (for example) less than 40 percent. As mentioned in the text, the 1960 survey reports dollar values for the value of the spending unit's home and for their equity in the home, as well as the dollar value of their liquid assets. Included in my measure of their assets is an estimate of the value of their stocks. The value of stock ownership is reported only in bins;
I use the midpoint of each bin (and $25,000 for the top code, which corresponded to a value of $25,000 and above). The survey also contains information on the value of real estate that the unit owns other than the home, but not information on the value of their equity in it. The values are similarly reported in bins, for which I use the midpoints and the top code in a similar manner.
Assuming that the spending unit has 100 percent equity in its non-home real estate would lower the estimates of reductions in home ownership slightly. The reduction in home ownership associated with a 10 percent downpayment would be 1.55 percentage points instead of 1.68 percentage points; the estimate for a 40 percent downpayment would be a reduction of 6.86 percentage points instead of 7.77 percentage points; and the estimate for a 50 percent downpayment would be a reduction of 9.52 percentage points instead of 11.04 percentage points.
Appendix 2: Tenure choice model and calibration
A simple model of asset accumulation and tenure choice, calibrated using characteristics of housing markets in 1960, clarifies the predictions of the life-cycle tenure choice framework at the ages I examine in the empirical analysis. Consider the infinite-horizon optimization problem of an individual with discount rate r, whose per-period utility U (C t , H t ) is defined over a composite consumption good C t and housing H t . All individuals begin life as renters, with no assets, but may purchase a house at T ∈ (0, ∞) subject to a down-payment constraint. I follow Fumio Hayashi, Takatoshi Ito and Joel Slemrod (1988) in assuming that U (C t , H t ) = α log C t + (1 − α) log H t . For simplicity, I impose the condition that housing is available only in a fixed quantity H R for renters, and H O for owners, and capture the idea that 'pride of ownership' may give greater utility from owning a given amount of housing rather than renting it by supposing that for an owner, H t = γH O , where γ ≥ 1.
An individual has income y t each period. She may save only for home purchase, at an interest rate ρ, and chooses an amount of savings s t in each period for which she is a renter. Normalizing the price of the consumption good to 1, the price of a unit of rental housing is R, and the analogous price of owner-occupied housing is P . Finally, φ is a constant that converts the amount P H O into a per-period payment φP H O . As discussed in the previous section, since maturities increased at the same time as down-payments fell, I will assume that changes in down-payments do not affect the per-period payment.
If an individual chooses to buy at some finite T , she solves
I will consider the simple case in which income is constant at y and ρ = r. Under these conditions, the savings rate is constant, and reductions in down-payments lead to earlier home purchase. To calibrate the model, I assume that rented and owned housing are identical and deliver a single unit of housing services, or H R = H O = 1, but that owned housing gives greater utility than the same amount of rented housing, with γ = 1.5. I set α = .8. Other parameters are meant to correspond specifically to housing market conditions in 1960. In particular, I set the annual rent at $700 and the house price at $12,000. I assume that the interest rate ρ and the monthly payment conversion factor φ are both .05. The latter condition implies that per-period housing costs are lower for an owner than for a renter. Heterogeneity in the simulation comes from variation in income. I draw income from a truncated lognormal distribution with mean 8 (corresponding to an income of $3,000), standard deviation 1, and a minimum income that allows everyone to afford the $700 annual rent. Each person then chooses the optimal time of home purchase (or, equivalently, per-period savings).
The simulation results in Figure A2 .1, shown for down-payments of 10 and 20 percent, confirm that reductions in down-payments are likely to have especially large effects on younger individuals. 1 The age-ownership profiles themselves, tracing the share of a cohort that owns over time, are somewhat more concave than those found in the data. However, the increases in home ownership at each age that result from reducing the down-payment from 20 to 10 percent reflect the differentially large impacts of lower down-payments on younger individuals. Importantly, there are some individuals who never choose to own under certain down-payment regimes, and lower barriers to ownership induce some of these individuals to become owners at some point. It is therefore possible in principle that one would observe long-lasting effects of eligibility for lower down-payments on home ownership. However, the main result that I will bring forward into the analysis is that at the ages I examine, differences in home ownership between individuals facing different down-payments are likely to be larger when they are younger than when they are older. Notes: Data reproduced from Table 2 of Herzog and Earley (1970) . Loan-to-value ratios for FHA and VA are average loan-to-value ratios of new loans for each year. Conventional LTV's are estimated median loan-to-purchase-price ratios for conventional loans made by savings and loan associations. Notes: Table reports estimated discontinuities at the cutoffs in probability of being an eligible veteran (columns 1 and 4), home ownership (columns 2 and 5), and scaled estimates of the impact of veteran status on home ownership (columns 3 and 6). 'Eligible veteran' is defined as being a veteran of the WWII or Korean War period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include fixed effects for season (quarter) of birth, race (white/non-white), and state of birth. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05, *: p < .1. Notes: Table reports coefficients on benefits-eligible veteran share in a quarter-of-birth-cohort level OLS regression of home ownership on the veteran share and a linear or quadratic trend in quarter of birth, by Census year. Additional controls in columns (2), (4), and (6) are season (quarter) of birth indicators, share nonwhite, and real GNP in the cohort's quarter of birth (from Gordon (1986) ). Sample includes men born in the US within the specified years. Conventional standard errors are in parentheses, HC3 standard errors in brackets. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05, *: p < .1. Notes: Columns (1) and (5) show estimates of the impact of veteran status on the log of total personal income in 1960, conditional on positive income, for each specification used. Columns (2) and (6) repeat estimates shown in the tables above. Columns (3) and (7) show estimates in sample with positive income. Columns (4) and (8) show estimate of veteran status on home ownership controlling for income. Conventional standard errors shown for cohort-trend models, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all other specifications. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05, *: p < .1.
State-specific breaks estimated in 1980 break sample 
(8) Table shows estimated effect of veteran status on the specified outcome, for the corresponding sample. 'Number of rooms' is set to zero for those living in group quarters. 'Complete plumbing' indicates running hot and cold water. Means given for ln(house value) are mean level of self-reported house value, in 1980 dollars (adjusted using CPI). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05, *: p < .1.
